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ON THE DECOMPOSITION OF WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
Jeremiah Cotton* 
Abstract-The often used method for decomposing wage dif-
ferentials into human capital and discrimination components is 
reformulated so that both the disadvantage, or "cost," dis-
crimination imposes on a black or minority wage earner and 
the advantage, or "benefit," it bestows on a white or majority 
wage earner can be estimated. 
Introduction 
T HE theories of human capital investment and economic discrimination taken together sug-
gest that differences in the average wages of racial 
groups occur both because of differences in their 
average skills or productivity characteristics and 
differences in the way the market treats or 
evaluates membership in a particular group, the 
level of skills notwithstanding. Moreover, accord-
ing to the dual labor market hypothesis the chief 
way the market is able to maintain and perpetuate 
such treatment differences is by routing minorities 
in disproportionate numbers into the secondary 
sector of the labor market and mainly white males 
into the primary sector. 
There have been a number of empirical studies 
in which attempts have been made to decompose 
observed racial wage and earnings differentials 
into these hypothesized "skill" and "treatment" 
components. One of the most often used decom-
position methods was first employed in demogra-
phy by Kitagawa (1955) and later popularized in 
the sociology literature by Duncan (1968) and 
Althauser and Wigler (1972), and in the eco-
nomics literature by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973). 
In his seminal work on labor market discrimina-
tion, Becker (1971) defined a competitive market 
discrimination coefficient for labor of different 
productivity as the difference between their ob-
served wage ratio and the wage ratio that would 
prevail in the absence of discrimination. Oaxaca 
(1973) expressed this difference in percentage terms 
as: 1 
(1) 
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1 Oaxaca investigated sexual rather than racial wage differ-
ences. However, inasmuch as the subsequent analysis focuses 
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where ww;wb is the observed white-black aver-
age wage ratio, and MPw jMPb is the ratio of the 
white-black average marginal products, which by 
assumption is the average wage ratio in the ab-
sence of discrimination. Expressed in logarithmic 
form, (1) becomes the white-black average wage 
differential: 
In ww - ln wb = ln MPW - In MPb 
+ln(D + 1). (2) 
The difference between the marginal products, 
In MPw- In MPb, is that part of the wage differ-
ential that is due to differences in white and black 
productivity, and ln(D + 1) is the treatment, or 
discrimination component. 
Now, in general, In W can be estimated by 
r.:_ 0B1 ~, where the X/s are average productiv-
ity-determining characteristics, and the B/s are 
least-square regression coefficients. Thus, (2) can 
be written as 
In ww- ln Wb = ~ Bwxw- ~ BbXb 
I..Jjj I..JJJ 
(j = 0, ... , K implied). (3) 
With some elementary manipulations the terms 
on the right-hand side of (3) can be decomposed 
into either 
In ww- ln Wb = L;B}(~w- ~b) 
+ L~w(Bt- B}) (4) 
or 
(5) 
The first terms on the right-hand sides of ( 4) 
and (5) are estimates of In MPw - In MPb, and 
the second terms are estimates of In( D + 1 ). 
Oaxaca explained these alternative forms of the 
decomposition in the following manner: 
On the basis of either of two assumptions, we can estimate the 
white-black wage ratio that would exist in the absence of 
discrimination: If there were no discrimination, 1) the wage 
structure currently faced by blacks would also apply to whites; 
2) the wage structure currently faced by whites would also 
apply to blacks. Assumption one (two) says that blacks (whites) 
on racial wage differences I have taken the liberty of substitut-
ing "white" for "male" and "black" for "female" in the 
reproductions of his formulas and the quote from his text. 
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would on average receive in the absence of discrimination the 
same wages as they presently receive, but that discrimination 
takes the form of whites (blacks) receiving more (less) than a 
nondiscriminating labor market would award them. (Oaxaca, 
1973, p. 695) 
The formulations in (4) and (5) correspond to 
Oaxaca's first and second assumptions, respec-
tively. In his empirical work he treated the issue as 
essentially an index number problem and obtained 
estimates from both formulations, using them to 
establish the range within which the true values of 
the components presumably would fall. Some sub-
sequent decompositioners followed Oaxaca's ex-
ample of estimating both forms, while others opted 
for one form or the other, or some variant of 
both. 2 Several analysts who used (5) did so be-
cause they believed the wage structure that would 
prevail in the absence of discrimination was more 
likely to be close to the white wage function than 
to the wage function of blacks. 3 
So far the principal concern of those who have 
considered this procedure has been largely statisti-
cal in nature. Among some of the adherents the 
problem of omitted variables has been the main 
worry. Since the second component is a residual, 
for it to be an exact measure of labor market 
discrimination all of the factors that determine the 
wage must be present and properly accounted for. 
If they are not, if perhaps because of data limita-
tions some have been excluded and others poorly 
measured, then the residual will reflect these 
2 See, e.g., Bloch and Smith (1977) and Kiefer and Smith 
(1977). The form used by Masters (1974) and Diaz-Etchevehere 
(1977) in respective black-white and Mexican-American-white 
earnings comparisons combined the first term of (4) with the 
second term of (5): 
In ww- In wb = LB/( x7- ~b)+ L:x!( B1w- B}) 
+ L(~w- x:)(B;w- B/). (2.1) 
This, however, necessitated the addition of a third term, called 
the "interaction" term. Masters interpreted this term as a 
measure of the relative magnitude of discrimination against 
blacks who have above-average educational and other produc-
tivity skills. See also Althauser and Wigler (1972) and lams 
and Thornton (1975). 
3 See, e.g., Gwartney and Long (1978) and Cotton (1985). 
Curiously, Masters took the same approach in defense of the 
second component of his decomposition (see footnote 2 above), 
arguing that the alternative form, :LXw(Bw- Bb) assumed 
that "we could give whites the black earnings function without 
changing that function. This assumption is less realistic than 
assuming no change in the white earnings function when it is 
given to blacks because they are only a small percentage of the 
population." (Masters, 1974, p. 343, footnote 3). Yet in his 
choice of his second term he apparently neglected his own 
good advice. 
omitted influences as well, and will therefore either 
over- or underestimate the extent of discrimina-
tion. 4 This is a long-standing problem and at 
present nothing very much can be done except to 
recognize the check it places on the interpretation 
of results. 
The criticism, however, that comes closest to 
revealing the main flaw in the construction of the 
Oaxaca decomposition is that made by Butler 
(1982). His most telling argument is that the at-
tempt to measure labor market discrimination by 
differences in white-black regression coefficients 
confounds market, or demand-side sources of dis-
crimination with those that originate on the non-
market, or supply-side. Such coefficients are taken 
4 Suppose data are available on only G of the K productivity 
characteristics that are assumed to fully determine the wage. 
Then the racial wage equation for the ;th individual is 
G 
In W' = ~ B' X' + e' 




e; = L B/X~. 
;-G+1 
The racial wage differential formed from (4.1) would be oper-
ationally equivalent to the fully specified differential only if 
E(e;) = 0. Since there is no reason to assume that this would 
be the case we have 
G 
E(ln W,') = L BlE( X,~) + E( e;) 
;-0 
G 
= L: B1 ~ + m' 
;-0 
G 
= (Bfi + m') + L B;x;. 
;=1 
(4.2) 
The effect of the omitted characteristics are captured in the 
intercept. The decomposition of the wage differential now 
takes the form: 
G 
In ww - In wb = L B;w( X: - ~b) 
;-1 
G 
+ L: x:(B1w- B}) + (Bt"- Btb) 
;-1 
(4.3) 
where Btf' = B(j + m'. The last two terms of the sum comprise 
the residual component and Jones (1983) has shown that it is 
impossible to assign a unique value to either element of this 
component. Thus, the residual is a mixture of discrimination 
and other omitted influences. However, it must be noted that 
many of these omitted factors, e.g., school quality or family 
background, may be themselves the result of past discrimina-
tion and to control for them may be tantamount to controlling 
for significant sources of discrimination. 
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from reduced-form equations and are therefore an 
amalgam of both demand and supply structural 
coefficients. And because of past supply-side dis-
crimination in the provision of education and 
other skill-acquiring opportunities, the demand for 
black labor might be more elastic than the de-
mand for the more capital-compatible white labor 
even in the absence of discrimination. In which 
case even though blacks and whites are identical 
in all other respects the white B1 's will be larger 
than the black B/s and any measure of dis-
crimination based on their differences will be 
overstated. 
Butler is correct in questioning the comparisons 
of black and white regression coefficients. He is 
not correct, however, to assume that these are the 
coefficients that would prevail in the absence of 
discrimination. For without discrimination we 
would not expect differences in the black and 
white B1 's to persist. Perhaps in the short run just 
after discrimination has been eliminated one might 
observe blacks and whites with different average 
skills because of different opportunities in the 
past, but in the long run as blacks are assured of 
competing on equal terms in the same markets as 
whites the differences in supply characteristics can 
be expected to diminish along with differences in 
the demand for black and white labor. Indeed it is 
this very expectation of continuing convergence of 
black and white skills that is heralded by the 
proponents of the vintage hypothesis. 5 
In this paper it is contended that the Oaxaca 
decomposition procedure is flawed because of its 
failure to portray adequately the most critical of 
Becker's original conditions, viz., the wage struc-
ture that would prevail in the absence of dis-
crimination. If Oaxaca's first assumption were 
used, i.e., if we assumed that blacks would receive 
the same wage in the absence as in the presence of 
discrimination, then barring envy or malice to-
wards white wage earners (and unrequited benevo-
lence toward employers), blacks would have no 
particular economic reason for desiring an end to 
such discrimination since their wages would be 
unaffected by the change and the only other effect 
would be to lower white wages. On the other 
hand, if we use the second assumption and once 
again bar e4tra-market malevolence or benevo-
lence, whites would have no objection to ending 
5 See Smith and Welch (1977), (1978). 
discrimination since their own wages would not be 
affected thereby. 
Separately considered, each assumption ab-
stracts from the central reality of wage and other 
forms of economic discrimination: not only is the 
group discriminated against undervalued, but the 
preferred group is overvalued, and the underval-
uation of the one subsidizes the overvaluation of 
the other.6 Thus, the white and black wage struc-
tures are both functions of discrimination and we 
would not expect either to prevail in the absence 
of discrimination. 
The Nondiscriminatory Decomposition 
The derivation of a more suitable decomposi-
tion formula starts with Becker's assumption that 
in the absence of discrimination in perfectly com-
petitive markets whites and blacks would be per-
fect substitutes in production. Or put another way, 
in the absence of discrimination the only reason 
wage differences would arise would be because of 
differences in productivity characteristics. There-
fore, in the absence of discrimination the wage 
structures are assumed to be equal: B*w = B*b = 
B*, where B* is the nondiscriminatory wage struc-
ture. 
~ow consider the hypothetical term, 'E.B/ ( ~w 
- X/). This is the difference in the current white 
and black average productivity characteristics 
evaluated as the market would in the absence of 
discrimination. It is therefore the "true" value of 
the skill component of the wage differential. 
Consider also the hypothetical term, 'E.B1 * Xt 
These are the current white average productivity 
characteristics valued as they would be in the 
absence of discrimination. The difference between 
this term and the first term on the right-hand side 
of (3) is solely due to differences in the way whites 
are currently treated and the way they would be 
treated in the absence of discrimination, 
"[.B1w~w _ LB/~w = "[.Xt(Bt- B/). 
6 Some Marxists claim that the only beneficiaries of dis-
crimination are capitalist employers and that both white and 
black workers lose or are "undervalued." (See Reich, 1968.) 
And while in general agreement, Harris (1978) suggests that 
perhaps the rate of exploitation of black labor exceeds that of 
white labor. Others such as Baron (1975) and Baran and 
Sweezy (1966) appear to believe that once capitalism passed 
from its competitive to its monopoly stage the profitable use of 
discrimination diminished for the capitalist class. Now ideo-
logical and psychological factors rather than pecuniary ones 
account for the persistence of racism. 
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This is therefore that part of the treatment compo-
nent of the wage differential which, if positive, is 
due to whites' "pure" treatment advantage. A 
similar situation exists with respect to blacks, and 
we have 
"B* J(b _ "Bb}(b = "J(b(B* _ Bb). 
'--11 '--11 '--11 1 
This is that part of the treatment component 
which, if positive, measures blacks' "pure" treat-
ment disadvantage. The average wage differential 
is therefore decomposed as 
ln ww- ln wb = LB/(~w- ~b) 
+ L~w(Blw- B/) 
+ L~b(B/- B/). (6) 
In this decomposition the treatment or dis-
crimination component is made up of two ele-
ments, one representing the amount by which 
white productivity characteristics are overvalued 
(the "benefit" of being a white worker), and the 
other the amount by which black productivity 
characteristics are undervalued (the "cost" of being 
a black worker).7 
A graphic distinction between the Oaxaca de-
composition and the formulation in (6) is shown 
in figure 1. As drawn, the three simplified wage 
functions are assumed to depend solely on pro-
ductivity characteristic X. The Oax~ca deco~posi­
tion of the wage differential is (Bwxw- BwXb) + 
(BwXb) - BbXb). This is the equation (5) version 
of the decomposition and it overestimates the 
"true" productivity difference and underestimates 
the "true" treatment difference. The decomposi-
tion given in (6) is (Bwxw- B*Xw) + (B*Xw-
B*Xb) + (B*Xb- BbXb). 
The major operational weakness of (6), how-
ever, is the fact that the B* vector is unobserved 
and therefore must be estimated if the formulation 
is to be useful for empirical work. Such an estima-
tor of course is subject to criticism inasmuch as its 
construction must be based on a number of rather 
strong assumptions about the nature of B*. The 
7 The interpretation of, say, L.B* J{h is no m~e difficult than 
the interpretation of the Oaxaca term, L.B"'Xh. The former 
values the black characteristics "as if there were no discrimina-
tion" and the latter values the black characteristics "as if 
blacks had the white wage structure." Nor for that matter is it 
any more difficult than the interpretation of B, the regression 
coefficient, as the change in the dependent variable "if a unit 
change occurred in the independent variable"-a most hypo-
thetical event indeed. 
FIGURE 1.-DECOMPOSITION OF THE WHITE-BlACK 
WAGE DIFFERENTIAL 






first of these assumptions is a restatement of the 
conclusions previously drawn about the expected 
outcomes of wage and other forms of economic 
discrimination, viz., in the absence of discrimina-
tion whites would receive a lower average wage 
than they currently receive and blacks would re-
ceive a higher average wage. Thus, 
L:Bt~ > LB/ ~ > L:B/~-
Second, it is assumed that in the absence of dis-
crimination the prevailing market structun: will be 
some function of the forces that currently de-
termine the white and black wage structures. This 
assumption is simplified by specifying B* as a 
linear function of Bw and Bb, the respective white 
and black wage structures. Third, it is assumed 
that the nondiscriminatory wage structure will be 
closer to the current white wage structure than to 
the current black wage structure. 8 This third as-
sumption is operationalized by weighting the white 
and black wage structures by the respective pro-
portions of white and black males in the employed 
civilian male labor force. 9 Thus, the estimator of 
8 Bergmann (1971, p. 310) concluded that "for the great 
majority of whites the end of discrimination would have only a 
minor effect on rates of pay. Those whites in the lowest bracket 
would bear the brunt of the change." 
9 Some decompositioners who recognized that the nondis-
crimmatory wage structure should lie between the wage struc-
ture of the maJority group and that of the minonty group 
arbitrarily assigned equal weight to both groups (See Coleman 
et al., 1971; Lopreato and Poston, 1977; and Reimers, 1983). 
Reimers wrote a general expression for the skill component of 
the wage differential in matrix form as 
(9.1) 
where I is the identity matrix and D a dtagonal matrix of 
Copyright© 2001 All Rights Reserved 
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B* used in this note is defined as 
B* = fwBw + fbBb (7) 
where fw and fb are the proportions. In 1979, the 
year covered by this study, approximately 90% of 
the males in the employed civilian male labor 
force were white, while about 9% of such workers 
were black. 10 
Finally, implicit in this formulation is the as-
sumption that neither total actual output nor the 
total wage bill would change in the absence of 
discrimination. The only effect would be a redistri-
bution of income and jobs. Thus, there is no 
expectation that the elimination of discrimination 
would also eliminate the tendency toward an un-
derutilization of the labor force. As Thurow (1969, 
pp. 134-135) has observed, although total poten-
tial output would be greater in the absence than in 
the presence of discrimination, "to the extent that 
there is a surplus of labor of all types and skills, 
eliminating discrimination and reshuflling the 
labor force would result in a redistribution of 
income but no real gain in actual output." 
In order to compare the results from the non-
discriminatory formula in (6) with the alternative 
formulations of the Oaxaca decomposition given 
in (4) and (5), each will be used to estimate the 
components of the wage differential of white and 
black males. 
Empirical Wage Model and 
Decomposition Results 
The data used in this analysis were taken from 
the 1% sample of the Public Use Samples of the 
1980 Census. Coverage was restricted to white and 
black males 16 years and over who had positive 
earnings and hours worked and who resided in the 
Northeastern states of New York and Pennsyl-
vania; the Midwestern states of Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin; the Southwestern 
weights. When D = 0, the expression is equal to the skill 
component of (4), and when D = I, it is equivalent to that of 
(5). Reimers chose D = (0.5)1 as the weights for the nondis-
criminatory wage structure. The formulation derived in (6), 
however, would suggest an approximate value of D = (0.9)1. 
For all the reasons adduced in the text the latter value would 
appear to be closer to the true value of the weights for the 
nondiscriminatory wage structure. 
10 See Employment and Earnings 27 (4) (Apr. 1980),_ table 
A-59. The relative proportion of white to black males m the 
civilian male labor force has been fairly constant at 10 to 1 
since 1973. 
states of California and Texas; and the Southern 
states of Georgia and North Carolina. There were 
21,341 white males and 2,785 black males in the 
samples. 
The mean values of the explanatory variables of 
the wage model along with their respective re-
gression coefficients are given in table 1. The com-
parative performance of the two most important 
variables in the model, education and work experi-
ence, was generally as expected. White males had 
about a year and a half more schooling than 
blacks and the average rate of return to an ad-
ditional year of schooling for whites was consider-
ably greater than that for blacks. In addition, the 
wage-experience profile of white males was well 
above the black male profile. 
The log hourly wage for white males was 2.0125, 
and the corresponding geometric mean wage was 
$7.48. For blacks the log wage was 1.7987, and the 
geometric mean wage was $6.04. Thus, the result-
ing log wage differential was 0.2138, and the mean 
wage difference was $1.44. 
The decomposition of these differentials using 
equation (6), the hypothetical formulation that 
incorporates an estimate of the nondiscriminatory 
wage structure, is given in the first row of table 2. 
There it is estimated that approximately 49% of 
the log wage difference was due to white males' 
skill or productivity advantage evaluated as it 
would have been in the absence of discrimination. 
Translated into dollars and cents it means that 
about 71¢ of the $1.44 wage gap was due to skill 
differences between whites and blacks. The white 
male treatment advantage accounted for some 
22 ~% of the log wage differential, or about 32¢ of 
the mean wage gap. This is the difference in the 
wage white males currently receive and what they 
would receive in the absence of discrimination. 
The treatment disadvantage component for 
black males was over 28% of the log wage differ-
ence and represented about 41¢ of the $1.44 wage 
gap. This is the difference in the current black 
male wage and the wage they would receive if 
there were no discrimination. 
In the last two rows of table 2 estimates of the 
skill and treatment components obtained by using 
the Oaxaca decomposition formulas of equations 
(4) and (5) are presented. As expected, equation 
(4) underestimates the "true" value of the skill 
differential and overestimates the treatment com-
ponent, whereas equation (5) does the reverse. 
Copyright© 2001 All Rights Reserved 
TABLE 1.-MEAN VALVES AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL Y ARIABLES 
(ESTIMATED STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES) 
White Black 
Mean Regression Mean Regression 
Variables Values Coefficients Values Coefficients 
Education 12.13 0.0756" 1065 0.0427" 
(0.0112) (0.0145) 
Work Experience 16 44 0.0377" 16.27 0.0212b 
(0.0086) (0.0111) 
Work Experience2 468.86 -0.0006" 464.32 -0.0004" 
(0.00002) (0.0001) 
Married, Wife Present 0.768 0 2909" 0.604 0.1801" 
(0.0255) (0.0486) 
Once Married 0086 0.1147" 0173 0.1466" 
(0 031) (0.0333) 
Urban Residence 0.411 0.1219" 0.792 0.1733b 
(0.0099) (00826) 
Veteran 0.538 0.0239 0411 0.1325b 
(0.0211) (0.0772) 
Government Worker 0.196 -0.0276b 0.289 -0.0199 
(0.0131) (0.0207) 
Region: 
Northeast 0 324 0 0638b 0.439 01114 
(0.0392) (0.0917) 
Southwest 0.244 0.0955 0 23 -0.0678" 
(0.0665) (0.0214) 
South OOQ8 - 0.1052" 0097 -0.1931" 
(0 0412) (0.0537) 
Industry: 
ConstructiOn 0102 0.2891" 0066 0.4148" 
(0.0488) (0.1809) 
Mfg. Durablesj 0 341 0.1966" 0 352 0.3979b 
Nondurables (0 0475) (0 2088) 
Trans & Pub Uhl. 0.123 0.2311" 0.144 0.6812" 
(0.049) (0.2773) 
Wholesale/Retail Trade 0141 -0.0267 0105 0.1717 
(0.0444) (0.1502) 
Insurance/Real Estate 0.057 0.1582" 0.041 0.3794 
(0.0617) (0.2496) 
Household Service 0.0007 0.0953 00069 0.2512 
(0 1595) (0.2779) 
Miscellaneous Service 0.117 
-0.1249" 0163 0 3002b 
(0.0423) (0.16815 
Public Administration 0.083 0.1169" 0.085 0 4671" 
(0.0378) (0.2128) 
Constant 1.0 0 3133" 1.0 0.4606" 
(0.0527) (0 2128) 
R2 0.281 0.196 
SSE 04057 04171 
N 21,341 2,785 
In Hourly Wage 2.0125 1 7987 
Mean Hourly Wage $7 48 $6.04 
(Geometric Mean) 
:s1gruficant at the 0 01 level or less 
S1gmficant at the 0 10 level or less 
[ 241 ] 
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TABLE 2.-DECOMPOSITION Of WHITE-BLACK MALE WAGE DIFFERENTIAL USING 
DECOMPOSITION EQUATIONS (4), (5) AND (6) 
(PERCENTAGE OF WAGE DiffERENTIAL IN PARENTHESES) 













Indeed, had we only these two equations with 
which to capture the values of the white-black 
skill and treatment components we would have a 
very wide range to deal with. According to equa-
tion (4), only about 5% of the wage differential 
was due to skill differences and the other 95% to 
treatment differences. On the other hand, equation 
(5) estimated that nearly 52% of the differential 
was due to a skill gap and about 48% to differen-
tial treatment. 
Conclusion 
The main defect in previous attempts to decom-
pose wage differentials has been shown to be due 
to a failure of past decompositioners to appreciate 
fully the underlying theory of discrimination that 
should have guided both the construction of their 
decomposition formulas and the interpretation of 
the resulting components. As a consequence they 
ended up either underestimating or overestimating 
the hypothesized skill and treatment differences. 
The form of the decomposition procedure de-
rived in this paper not only yields more nearly 
accurate estimates of the components of the wage 
differential but also models the true state of differ-
ential treatment by estimating the "cost" to the 
group discriminated against as well as the "bene-
fits" accruing to the favored group. 
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